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Zimbabwe adopted a new Constitution 
in 2013 (Constitution of Zimbabwe) 
which, among other things recognises 
the role of the institution of traditional 
leadership which operates alongside 
modern state structures. While 
strengthening the role and status of the 
institution this new Constitution strictly 
regulates the conduct of traditional 
leaders. Despite this upliftment and 
strict regulation, the role and relevance 
of the institution of traditional 
leadership is under significant scrutiny. 
Traditional leaders are often in conflict 
with State structures, particularly rural 
local governments, which is largely 
attributed to competition for power, 
resources and legitimacy. It is the 
conduct of traditional leaders, however, 
that is cause for concern and raises 
constitutional questions. Their 
perceived alignment with the ruling 
Zimbabwe African National Unity-
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has brought 
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renewed criticism of their relevance in a modern-day society anchored on democratic 
values. Yet, traditional leaders still undertake important responsibilities especially in 
rural areas where 67 per cent of the population resides. Traditional leaders deliver 
various government responsibilities in some parts of Zimbabwe where the State has no 
or a limited presence. Their legitimacy, control and influence in rural areas remain 
widespread demonstrating remarkable resilience, despite facing various threats. 
Successive governments in both colonial and independent Zimbabwe have sought to 
maximise this strength for their respective narrow political interests. All these 
controversies, conflicts and complexities raise questions about the role and relevance of 
the institution of traditional leadership in Zimbabwe which this article seeks to 
untangle.  
The article is organised as follows. The first part of the article provides a brief 
contextual background to the role of the institution of traditional leadership in 
Zimbabwe. This is followed by an examination of the appointment and removal from 
office of traditional leaders. The remuneration of traditional leaders is then discussed 
before an examination of their powers and responsibilities is provided. The article then 
examines the relationship between traditional leaders and modern-day State 
institutions. The last part seeks to establish whether traditional leaders are complying 
with the required ethical conduct, which is now regulated by the Constitution. 
Concluding remarks then follows. 
2 CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND 
As in many other parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the institution of traditional leadership 
has always been central to the governance of communities in Zimbabwe. Traditional 
authorities take various forms and shapes in many African countries including 
Zimbabwe.  In Zimbabwe, for example, the structures and systems of the institution of 
leadership in Ndebele, Shona, Kalanga, Tonga and Venda ethnic communities have some 
remarkable differences even though they also depict certain similarities. Currently and 
generally, the institution of traditional leadership comprises chiefs, headmen and village 
heads- in order of hierarchy.1 Village heads are physically the closest to the people and 
thus, have the most interactions with the citizens in rural areas. Prior to the colonisation 
of Zimbabwe, the institution of traditional leadership was the sole governance structure 
with legitimacy to govern derived from tradition and culture.2 Traditional leaders had 
fused “governmental” powers and authority, ie judicial, administrative and political. 
Soon after colonisation in 1890 the colonial government dismantled, and in some cases 
replaced, traditional governance structures with “modern” State institutions as it sought 
to advance its interests and exercise firm control over the Black population.3 It 
embarked on a diversity of measures that corrupted the institution of traditional 
leadership. Some of the powers of traditional leaders, such as the power to allocate land, 
                                                 
1
 Musekiwa N “The role of local authorities in democratic transition” in Masunungure E & Sumba J (eds) 
Democratic transition (Harare: Weaver Press and IDAZIM 2012) at 242. 
2
 Chigwata TC “Decentralization in Africa and the resilience of traditional authorities: evaluating Zimbabwe's 
track record” (2015) 25(5) Regional and Federal Studies 439 at 445. 
3
 Keulder C Traditional leaders and local government in Africa: lessons for South Africa (Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council 1998) at 201.  
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were taken away or limited. Chiefs became salaried government officials accountable to 
the colonial government and some of them began to be appointed outside the relevant 
ruling clan or tribe.4 Thereafter, the role of the institution was under constant re-
definition by the successive governments in the colonial century-long period.  
The situation has not been different in the independent era where the majority-
led government has in various ways (re-)modelled the role of the institution of 
traditional leadership depending on its interests. Due to urbanisation, the role of the 
institution is now most visible in the rural areas of Zimbabwe where it operates 
alongside modern State structures, particularly rural local governments. The country 
has a multi-level system of government with the government organised at the national, 
provincial and local levels.5 The provincial tier of government is composed of provincial 
and metropolitan councils which govern provinces and metropolitan provinces, 
respectively.6 The metropolitan provinces of Harare and Bulawayo are purely urban. 
The remaining eight provinces consist of rural and urban areas. The local tier of 
government is composed of urban local authorities (councils) and rural local authorities 
(rural district councils) established to manage and represent the affairs of people in 
urban and rural areas, respectively. Each of the rural provinces has between six and 
eight districts which are administered by local authorities under the supervision of a 
District Administrator (DA).7 The DA is appointed by and accountable to the national 
government through the Minister responsible for local government. This civil servant is 
the most senior representative of the national government at the local level charged 
with a variety of administrative functions including facilitating the appointment of 
traditional leaders.8 The DA chairs major decision making and resource allocating 
bodies at the local level, such as, the Rural District Development Committee9, the 
District Land Committee10 and the Disaster Management Committee.  
The districts are administered by local authorities alongside the institution of 
traditional leadership comprising chiefs, headmen and village heads. The jurisdiction of 
traditional leaders does not correspond to the formal boundaries of these districts. 
Usually a district has more than one chieftainship with each led by a chief. The 
boundaries of jurisdictions of chiefs are a contested area as the traditional leaders seek 
to expand their geographical area of influence. There are around 272 chiefs nation-
                                                 
4
 Ndlovu M & Dube N “Analysis of the relevance of traditional leaders and the evolution of traditional 
leadership in Zimbabwe: a case study of amaNdebele” (2012) 7(1) International Journal of African Renaissance 
Studies 50 at 57. 
5
 See section 5 Constitution of Zimbabwe, Amendment No. 20 of 2013. 
6
 The provincial tier of government has not been established more than three years after the adoption of the new 
Constitution 
7
 Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation (CCMT) Role and responsibilities in rural local 
governance in Zimbabwe: parallels, overlaps and conflict (Harare: CCMT 2014) at 10.  
8
 CCMT (2014) at 10. 
9
 The Committee brings together councillors, chiefs and other relevant actors to undertake development 
planning, coordination and implementation. See section 60 Rural District Councils Act chapter 29:13 Act 8 of 
1998. 
10
 The Committee is responsible for the allocation and management of land in resettlement areas. Like the Rural 
District Development Committee, the District Land Committee draws its membership from representatives of 
the national government at the district level, officials from the relevant local authority and traditional leaders, 
among others. 
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wide.11 Each district is divided into wards, with each ward represented on the council 
by an elected councillor. The ward consists of six or more villages. Section 18(1) of the 
Traditional Leaders Act12 requires the establishment of a ward assembly for every ward 
under the jurisdiction of a rural local authority. The assembly is composed of the 
councillor, all headmen and village heads in the respective ward. It is chaired by a 
headman elected from amongst the membership of the ward assembly.13 Thus while the 
elected councillor represents the ward on the council, it is actually a traditional leader 
(headman) who provides leadership to the ward. The ward councillor chairs the ward 
development committee which is charged with providing technical assistance to the 
ward assembly including the formulation of a ward development plan for submission to 
the relevant local authority.14 There are about 452 headmen in the entire country with 
each of them having the status of a sub-chief.15 A headman reports to the chief of the 
relevant area. 
The village is the lowest unit of organisation constituted by an average of 35 
households.16  There are an estimated 25 000 village heads with each leading a village. 
The village head (sabhuku) chairs the village assembly (dare or inkundla) as well as the 
village development committee. The committee is the technical arm of the assembly 
responsible for participatory development planning and implementation. The village 
head reports to the relevant headman.17 It has been observed that rural local 
governance is characterised by three main distinct authority structures- the DA, local 
authority and institution of traditional leaders.18 Each of these actors draws on 
divergent sources of legitimacy and exercises power and responsibilities which overlap 
significantly.19 When competency and jurisdiction boundaries are not clear or are in 
dispute, conflicts among the three actors are bound to occur as they assert their legal 
and customary spaces. While the DA and local authorities play a crucial role in rural 
local government the discussion is primarily focused on the role of the traditional 
institution.   
3 APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL FROM OFFICE OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
Generally, rural communities in Zimbabwe have great respect for their traditional 
leaders and they treat them with considerable esteem. This respect is even more 
entrenched when the communities feel that their traditional leaders are appointed from 
                                                 
11
 Musekiwa (2012) at 240-2. 
12
 Chapter 29:17 Act 25 of 1998. 
13
 Section 18(2) Traditional Leaders Act 1998. 
14
 See section 59 Rural District Councils Act 1988. 
15
 Musekiwa (2012) at 242. 
16
 CCMT (2014) at 11. 
17
 Musekiwa (2012) at 242. 
18
 Other actors in rural local governance include non-governmental organisations, officials of government 
ministries and agencies and the police. 
19
 CCMT (2014) at 9. The office of DA is a deconcentrated body, therefore authority and power directly flow 
from the national government. The legitimacy of local authorities and their councillors originates from popular 
election whereas that of traditional leaders is derived from custom and tradition. 
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the relevant community and in accordance with the traditional norms of succession.20 In 
some areas, the principles of succession were distorted by the colonial administration, 
putting a significant dent in the legitimacy of the relevant traditional leaders. Legislative 
enactments21 in the independent era have sought to revive these principles of 
succession. The 2013 Constitution built on these enactments by requiring the 
appointment of traditional leaders in accordance with the relevant traditional norms 
and practices. The Constitution directs Parliament to enact legislation providing for the 
appointment and removal from office of traditional leaders.22 Such legislation must 
make provision for the appointment of chiefs by the President on the recommendation 
of the relevant provincial assembly of chiefs through the National Council of Chiefs and 
the Minister responsible for traditional affairs (the Minister).23 A similar procedure is 
applicable with respect to the removal, suspension and resolution of disputes relating to 
the appointment, removal and suspension, of chiefs. The Traditional Leaders Act makes 
provision for the appointment of headmen by the Minister from a list of persons 
nominated by the chief of the relevant area.24 Village heads are appointed by the 
Secretary responsible for traditional affairs from a list of persons nominated by the 
relevant headmen with the approval of the chief. 25 
Traditional leaders hold office for life unless removed from their respective 
positions for misconduct. While it was considered taboo in the past to appoint women 
as traditional leaders, more women than before are being appointed as traditional 
leaders showing the adaptability of the institution to the modern world.26 For instance, 
since independence, no less than five women have been appointed as substantive chiefs 
while several others have been appointed as headmen and village heads.27 Under the 
previous constitutional order, the appointment of chiefs solely by the President meant 
that chiefs were “controlled” and accountable to the national government and the ruling 
political party, in particular.28 This claim may be supported by evidence from the 
colonial and post-colonial eras which suggests the alignment of chiefs to the 
government of the day. Makumbe suggests that to engender the accountability of chiefs 
to rural communities through the institution of traditional leadership, they should be 
appointed by the National Council of Chiefs in accordance with traditional practices.29 
While the new Constitution has not taken away these relevant powers from the 
President and bestowed them on the National Council of Chiefs, it has at least reduced 
                                                 
20
 Dodo O “Traditional leadership systems and gender recognition: Zimbabwe” (2013) 1(1) International 
Journal of Gender and Women‘s Studies 29 at 30. 
21
 Chief and Headmen Act chapter 29: 01 Act 29 of 1982 and Traditional Leaders Act 1998. 
22
 Section 283 Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
23
 Section 283(i) Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
24
 Section 8(1) Traditional Leaders Act 1998. 
25
 Section 11(1) Traditional Leaders Act 1998. 
26
 See Ndlovu M & Dube N “Analysis of the relevance of traditional leaders and the evolution of traditional 
leadership in Zimbabwe: A case study of amaNdebele” (2010) 7(1) International Journal of African 
Renaissance Studies 50 at 63-64. 
27
 Dodo (2013) at 36. 
28
 Keulder (1998) at 179; Makumbe J (2010) “Local authorities and traditional leadership” in De Visser J, 
Steytler N & Machingauta N (eds) Local government in Zimbabwe: a policy dialogue (Bellville: Community 
Law Centre, University of the Western Cape 2010) at 93. 
29
 Makumbe (2010) at 98. The role of the National Council of Chiefs will be discussed in detail below. 
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the appointment and disciplining of traditional leaders from being a completely political 
process determined by the President.30 The President can only appoint individuals as 
chiefs upon the recommendation of the relevant provincial assembly of chiefs and the 
National Council of Chiefs. 
There are further constitutional limitations on the exercise of the power to 
appoint chiefs besides the role of the relevant provincial assembly of chiefs and the 
National Council of Chiefs. The appointment of traditional leaders must be carried out in 
accordance with the prevailing culture, customs, traditions and practices of the 
communities concerned.31 Section 3(2) of the Traditional Leadership Act merely obliges 
the President to consider the prevailing customary principles of succession applicable 
to the community over which the chief is to preside.32 This provision of the Act suggests 
that the President has some discretion when appointing chiefs. This line of reasoning 
was confirmed by the High Court in Moyo v Stephen Mkoba & Others.33 The Court 
declared that the President was only required to give “due consideration to the 
customary principles of succession”, not to follow them when appointing a chief. This 
followed an application brought before the court in which Golden Moyo (the applicant) 
was contesting the decision of the President to appoint Stephen Mkoba (the 
respondent) as Chief Bunina in 2006. The 2013 Constitution has changed this practice 
by obliging the President to carry out the appointment of chiefs in accordance with the 
prevailing culture, customs, traditions and practices of the communities concerned.34 
This entails that while the President may have the power to appoint chiefs, he or she is 
not at liberty to appoint anyone to the position of chief, headman or village head due to 
custom and tradition.35 This also means that section 3(2) of the Traditional Leaders Act 
must be aligned with the new constitutional order.  
It is generally accepted that “politics is ubiquitous” as it permeates all corners of 
society. Certainly, the appointment of traditional leaders may be no exception. While 
acknowledging this fact, the 2013 Constitution seeks to protect the appointment of 
chiefs from being based purely on political grounds. The Constitution directs Parliament 
to enact legislation to ensure that the appointment, suspension, succession and removal 
of traditional leaders is carried out fairly and without regard to political 
considerations.36 Further, the relevant Act should also provide measures to safeguard 
the integrity of traditional institutions and their independence from political 
interference.37 It is, however, important to mention that the independence of the 
institution of traditional leadership is not likely to be guaranteed by only formal 
legislative insulation. The commitment by all the relevant parties, including the 
government, to respect the independence of the institution of traditional leadership is 
                                                 
30
 See Sachikonye L, Chawata S, Mangongera C & Ndoro S Consolidating democratic governance in Southern 
Africa: Zimbabwe EISA Research Report No 30 (Johannesburg: EISA Johannesburg 2007) at 88. See also, 
Keulder (1998) at 179. 
31
 Section 283 Constitution of Zimbabwe.    
32
 Section 3(2) Traditional Leaders Act 1998. 
33
 Moyo v Stephen Mkoba & Others [2012] ZWBHC 7 (19 January 2012). 
34
 Section 283 Constitution of Zimbabwe.    
35
 Chigwata (2015) at 442. 
36
 Section 283(iii) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
37
 Section 283(iv) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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equally important. As will be observed below, evidence in Zimbabwe suggests that the 
institution is not independent despite the legislative insulation. 
4 REMUNERATION OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
Under the previous constitutional order, traditional leaders received salaries and/or 
allowances from the government in appreciation of the services they provide to their 
respective communities and the nation at large. This practice of providing some form of 
remuneration to traditional leaders has its origins in the colonial period where chiefs 
were salaried officials just like public servants of the colonial government. Such 
remuneration entailed that chiefs were accountable to the government. The 2013 
Constitution acknowledges the need for the government to provide some form of 
remuneration to traditional leaders. It requires the remuneration and benefits of chiefs 
to be determined by the Minister responsible for finance after consultation with the 
Minister responsible for traditional affairs.38  Headmen and village heads also receive 
monthly allowances although they are insignificant compared to those of chiefs. While 
the respective Ministers for finance and traditional affairs have a role to play in the 
determination of the salaries and benefits of traditional leaders, it is ultimately the 
President who has the final decision making authority in relation to the nature and 
extent of the remuneration of traditional authorities.39  As in the case of judicial officials, 
the Constitution provides that the remuneration of chiefs may not be reduced whilst 
they are occupying their respective positions.40 Ideally, this requirement enhances the 
financial security of position holders and reduces their vulnerability to considerations 
of monetary gain when carrying out their duties. In practice, as discussed below, some 
traditional leaders have solicited bribes despite the certain measure of financial security 
they have. 
In addition to the monthly salaries to which chiefs are entitled, there is a cultural 
practice whereby chiefs are allowed to keep for their own use fines imposed on 
offenders who are brought before traditional courts. Chiefs also keep court appearance 
fees.  People appearing before the traditional court are required to pay US$5 for their 
case to be heard.41 Proceeds from the fines and court appearance fees are used at the 
discretion of the chief to support the activities of the institution of traditional leadership 
in the relevant chieftainship area. There is nothing that prevents the chiefs from using 
the proceeds for his or her own welfare given that there is little distinction, if any, 
between the chief as a person and the chief as the traditional leader. This is contrary to 
the democratic norm of accountability that requires such proceeds (public resources) to 
be expended only for the benefit of the public and never for personal gain. Chiefs also 
benefit from government programmes designed to uplift their living standards, such as, 
                                                 
38
 Section 284(1) Constitution of Zimbabwe. The remuneration of traditional leaders is paid out of the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund: see section 284(2) Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
39
 Section 284(1) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
40
 Section 284(3) Constitution of Zimbabwe.  
41
 “Chiefs demand same treatment at judges” Newsday 2 October 2014 Available at 
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/10/02/chiefs-demand-treatment-judges/ (accessed 2 October 2014). 
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subsidised vehicle purchasing schemes, electrification programmes, and housing 
schemes. In 2014, chiefs were receiving a monthly salary or allowance of US$ 300 per 
month and those in the National Council of Chiefs received an additional US$ 30.42 
Despite earning such an amount of money, chiefs, are not satisfied with the 
remuneration package they receive from the government. It is reported that chiefs are 
advocating for remuneration packages that match those of judges.43 Thus chiefs are 
unhappy that judges are remunerated better even though they carry out equally 
important functions which go beyond the judicial role of judges, as discussed in detail 
below. If all benefits are taken together chiefs have a fairly good remuneration package. 
Yet, some traditional leaders have been accused of accepting bribes, among other 
corrupt tendencies, despite the fact that they receive an allowance and other benefits 
from the government.44 Such corrupt activities tend to be common around areas 
involving resource allocation whether it be the allocation of land or farming inputs, 
among others. This shows that traditional leaders, like any other political leaders, are 
not immune to being corrupted. Remarkably, such corrupt behaviour has not adversely 
impacted on the influence of the institution of traditional leadership thus far.   
5 POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
Historically, and unlike modern state structures, traditional leaders drew their 
authority and legitimacy from an unwritten body of local customary law and practice.45 
As highlighted above, successive colonial governments in driving their colonial interests 
modified (either limited or enhanced) their role and influence at various stages.46 
Similarly, soon after independence, the Zimbabwe African National Unity (ZANU)-led 
government,47 through the Chiefs and Headmen of 1982, limited the role and influence 
of the institution of traditional leadership by taking away some of its powers and 
responsibilities. The Act did not recognise the role of village heads despite the fact that 
their role was widely accepted and had local legitimacy.48  The weakening of the 
institution of traditional leadership is considered as some form of retribution as the 
institution was “considered to have supported the exploitation of black Africans by 
collaborating with the colonial government”.49 Moreover, the ZANU-PF led government 
perceived “the existence of traditional authorities as a direct competition for legitimacy, 
                                                 
42
 Newsday 2 October 2014. Headmen and village heads were earning US$ 140 and US$ 25 per month, 
respectively. 
43
 Newsday 2 October 2014. 
44
 Rukuni T, Machingambi Z, Musingafi M & Kaseke K “The role of traditional leadership in conflict resolution 
and peace building in Zimbabwean rural communities: The case of Bikita District” (2015) 5(3) Public Policy 
and Administration Research 75 at 78. 
45
 CCMT (2014) at 9. 
46
 See Chigwata (2015) at 442. 
47
 In 1987, and under an agreement called the Unity Accord, ZANU merged with the Patriotic Front-Zimbabwe 
African People’s Unity (PF-ZAPU) political party to form the ZANU-PF. 
48
 CCMT (2014) at 13. Despite this lack of formal recognition, village heads exerted considerable influence and 
were significantly involved in the lives of the rural populace. 
49
 Chigwata (2015) at 448. See also Dodo (2013) at 31. 
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leadership and support”.50 Traditional leaders were also considered to be incompatible 
with the modern imperatives of democracy and development. 
The government stance towards the institution of traditional leadership changed 
in the second decade of independence. Dodo claims that the ruling political leaders 
wanted to gain political mileage out of the influence of and respect for, the institution 
and use it for political expedience.51 The legitimacy of ZANU-PF was being significantly 
questioned due to the declining political and economic situation. Thus the ruling party 
could not afford to have the institution of traditional leaders, with its support and 
legitimacy, on its “wrong” side.52 On the other hand, traditional leaders continued to 
lobby the government for the restoration of their powers. Most of the powers of the 
institution were restored through the Traditional Leadership Act 1998 which replaced 
the Chiefs and Headmen Act 1982.53 Thus the role and influence of the institution of 
traditional leadership have been under constant (re-)shaping since the colonial period 
and mostly through legislative enactments. Of late, the role of the institution has been 
shaped not only by ordinary legislation but also by constitutional enactments. Like its 
predecessor, the 2013 Constitution recognises and formalises the authority and 
legitimacy of the institutions. The Constitution explicitly lists a variety of powers and 
responsibilities of traditional leaders. Such recognition is significant in that the powers 
and responsibilities may not be taken away from traditional leaders without amending 
the Constitution. Thus, the institution of traditional leadership now has a high level of 
assurance with respect to their powers and responsibilities. The Constitution requires 
Traditional leaders in their areas of jurisdiction: 
a) to promote and uphold cultural values of their communities and, in 
particular, to promote sound family values; 
b) to take measures to preserve the culture, traditions, history and 
heritage of their communities, including sacred shrines; 
c) to facilitate development; 
d) in accordance with an Act of Parliament,  to administer Communal 
Land and to protect the environment; 
e) to resolve disputes amongst people in their communities in 
accordance with customary law; and 
f) to exercise any other functions conferred or imposed on them by Act 
of Parliament.54 
The Constitution further provides that, “except as provided in an Act of Parliament, 
traditional leaders have authority, jurisdiction and control over the Communal Land or 
other areas for which they have been appointed, and over persons within those 
                                                 
50
 Chigwata (2015) at 440. See also Ndlovu and Dube (2012) at 57-58. 
51
 Dodo (2013) at 30. 
52
 See Matondi HMG (2010) “Traditional authority and fast track land reform: Empirical evidence from 
Mazowe District” Zimbabwe Livelihoods after land reform in Zimbabwe Working Paper (Bellville: Institute for 
Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of Western Cape 2010) at 2. 
53
 The Traditional Leadership Act for the first time in the independent era formally recognises the role of village 
heads.  
54
 Section 282(1) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
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Communal Lands or areas”.55 The Traditional Leaders Act also assigns to chiefs the 
responsibility to supervise headmen and village heads; oversee the collection of levies, 
taxes, rates and charges payable to rural local authorities and conserve the environment 
and natural resources.56 Further, chiefs have the responsibility to notify rural local 
governments about the occurrence of natural disasters and the outbreak of epidemic 
diseases; publish public orders, directions or notices; protect public property; and 
promote the maintenance of good standards of health and education.  
The Traditional Leaders Act assigns similar functions to headmen and village 
heads with the primary role of these appointed officials being to support the chief at 
their respective levels.57 The supportive role is made possible by the fact that a chief 
may delegate all or any of his or her powers and responsibilities to a headman who may, 
in turn, delegate them to a village head.58 This essentially means that there are little, if 
any, powers and responsibilities of a chief which may not be delegated to lower levels. 
Any delegation, however, does not divest the chief or headman of that function, who 
may at any time revoke any order given by a headman or village head, respectively, in 
the exercise of that function. This right of chiefs and headmen only serves to limit the 
autonomy of the lower level traditional institutions.59 The Constitution states that when 
performing their functions “traditional leaders are not subject to the direction or 
control of any person, except as may be prescribed in an Act of Parliament”.60 Practice 
suggests that this constitutional requirement is not always respected by various 
agencies of the government as well as by certain political formations. The Traditional 
Leaders Act provides that in the exercise of his or her functions, a chief has the powers 
of a justice of the peace in terms of any law.61 The roles of traditional leaders can be 
broadly categorised into cultural, administrative, developmental, co-ordinative and 
judicial functions. 
5.1 Cultural, customary and traditional matters 
Traditional leaders have provided “spiritual” and cultural leadership to their respective 
communities over a multi-generational period.62 They are the custodians of culture, 
customs and traditions as a result of their fair appreciation of the culture and tradition 
of their respective communities. Dodo states that “culturally speaking it is believed that 
[traditional leaders] are the only agencies who can convince the ancestral spirits to 
accept or adopt any new concepts or ideology in the area”.63 The importance of this 
cultural leadership role is signified by its constitutional recognition. The 2013 
                                                 
55
 Section 282(2) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
56
 See section 5(1) Traditional Leaders Act 1998. Chiefs liaise and assist development committees of rural local 
authorities and maintain registers of names of villages and their inhabitants and of land certificates 
57
 See section 12(1) and section 9(1) Traditional Leadership Act 1998. 
58
 Section 6(1) Traditional Leaders Act 1998. 
59
 Sachikonye (2007) at 88. 
60
 Section 282(3) Constitution of Zimbabwe. 
61
 Section 5(2) Traditional Leaders Act 1998. 
62
 Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa (CPIA) Zimbabwe the next 25 years (Harare: Benady Printing and 
Publishing 2005) at 23; Ndlovu & Dube (2012) at 58; the Zimbabwe Institute Local government policy review, 
(Cape Town 2005) at 13.  
63
 Dodo (2013) at 32. 
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Constitution provides that traditional leaders are responsible for promoting and 
upholding the cultural values, traditions and heritage of their communities.64 As the 
head of the community, traditional leaders perform a number of functions linked to 
culture, customs and traditions. For example, traditional leaders usually lead 
delegations in African rain-making ceremonies. They officiate at other ceremonies, 
funerals and other public events where adherence to traditional practices is a 
requirement. Traditional leaders are expected to ensure that traditional values are 
observed with respect to burial arrangements, marriage and sacred shrines. Thus, the 
role of traditional leaders as custodians of the values of society is widely recognised in 
Zimbabwe.  
The widely recognised role of traditional leaders as cultural leaders is slowly 
being undermined by the conduct of some traditional leaders which goes against the 
traditional values and customs they are supposed to protect. Some traditional leaders 
are involved in corrupt activities especially in relation to the allocation of scarce 
resources, such as, land, farming inputs and food. For instance, Chief Negomo of 
Mashonaland Central Province was hauled before the courts accused of defrauding 
Mvurwi Grain Marketing Board of farming inputs (fertilisers) meant to benefit peasant 
farmers under the Presidential Summer Crop Season Programme.65 Instead of allocating 
the farming inputs to the intended beneficiaries, the Chief is alleged to have converted 
them for his personal use, including selling some of the inputs at the market price to 
members of the public. Such unethical conduct has brought into question the role of 
traditional leaders as spiritual and cultural leaders. Globalisation and modernisation, 
which have partially caused the dilution or merging of cultures across the globe, are also 
a significant threat to the cultural role of traditional leaders. Urbanisation is already 
reducing the traditional areas of influence of traditional leaders. How far will this 
cultural leadership role of traditional leaders last given these various threats? Only time 
will tell. 
5.2 Land matters 
Traditional leaders in most parts of Africa always played a role in the allocation and 
management of communal land for residential, agricultural and grazing purposes.66 In 
Zimbabwe, for example, traditional leaders are generally regarded as the custodians of 
the land and other natural resources in their respective jurisdictions.67 This role has 
been recognised in the 2013 Constitution of Zimbabwe. The Constitution allocates the 
power to administer communal land to traditional leaders to be exercised subject to 
legislation.68 The Traditional Leaders Act provides that chiefs have the responsibility to 
prevent any unauthorised settlement or use of communal land and to approve the 
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settlement of any new settlers in their areas.69 In terms of the Communal Land Act,70 
communal land may be occupied or used for agricultural or residential purposes only 
with the consent of the elected rural local government established for the area 
concerned.71 When granting consent to the occupation and use of communal land rural 
local governments are required to consider customary law relating to the allocation, 
occupation and use of land in the area concerned.72 Further, these elected bodies must 
also “consult and co-operate” with the relevant chief appointed to preside over the 
community concerned.73   
The legal regime around communal land management creates a high degree of 
ambiguity and potential for overlap of roles between traditional and State institutions. 
While the Communal Lands Act suggests that rural local governments are the 
custodians of land within their respective jurisdictions, the Traditional Leaders Act 
seems to allocate to chiefs some power over the allocation and management of 
communal land. In practice and due to custom and tradition, traditional leaders allocate 
and manage land blurring the competency boundaries with rural local governments.74 
As a result, conflicts and power struggles between traditional and elected structures 
with respect to the allocation and management of communal land are common.75 In 
some cases, traditional leaders have acted like parallel governments in rural areas by 
allocating land which would have been already allocated by the government to other 
beneficiaries. This challenge of “double allocation” is common in the new resettlement 
areas created after the fast-track land reform programme of early 2000. In these areas 
there tends to be acute contestation between government actors and traditional leaders 
over who has the power to register land rights, allocate and administer land, as well as 
resolve land disputes.76 For instance, in Chirumhanzu district of Midlands province 
Chief Nhema allegedly “illegally allocated” over 300 families on a piece of land in the 
resettlement areas without consulting the District Land Committee representing the 
government. The piece of land in dispute had been set aside by the relevant District 
Land Committee for grazing purposes. The over 300 families faced the threat of being 
evicted.77 While chiefs still have influence over land matters in communal areas, they 
feel relegated with respect to land allocation and management in resettlement areas. In 
these areas it is the relevant District Land Committee, representing the government, 
which has the power to allocate and manage land. Even though chiefs are part of the 
membership of the Committee they have limited influence over decision making partly 
because the committee is  dominated by government technocrats with the DA 
undertaking the leading role. As a result, some chiefs have over the years boycotted 
meetings of the Committee in protest.78 Such protest action does not have any 
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meaningful basis given that the resettlement areas where formerly under the control of 
white farmers and thus fell outside the jurisdiction of traditional authorities. Some 
traditional leaders, however, have contested this line of reasoning. They argue that the 
areas were once under the control of their forefathers before colonisation.79 Thus, their 
jurisdiction over these areas should be restored. For effective governance in these areas, 
there is a need to explore ways in which the DA, traditional leaders and rural local 
governments can work together in land related matters for the benefit of the 
communities. Local authorities can be assigned exclusive powers over communal land 
which they exercise subject to consultation with the relevant traditional leader.  
5.3 Environmental and natural resources matters 
The 2013 Constitution does not assign explicit powers over the environment to 
traditional leaders. It however provides that traditional leaders may exercise any other 
functions that may be assigned to them or imposed on them by an Act of Parliament.80 
The Traditional Leaders Act requires traditional leaders to ensure that land and its 
natural resources are used and exploited in terms of the law.81 Recently the government 
began to involve chiefs in determining beneficiation from the exploitation of natural 
resources through Community Share Ownership Trusts (CSOTs). The CSOTs are part of 
the government’s indigenisation policy designed to empower Black Zimbabweans by 
ensuring that communities benefit from the exploitation of natural resources in their 
respective areas. Under CSOTS, various communities represented by their chief were 
given shares in companies exploiting natural resources in their respective areas, 
particularly mineral resources. In practice, communities have not yet benefitted from 
these CSOTs due to a number of factors including corruption and the fact that the 
CSOTs, like the broader indigenisation policy, were doomed to fail from the onset due to 
their design.  
The Traditional Leaders Act requires traditional leaders to control over-
cultivation, overgrazing, and the indiscriminate destruction of flora and fauna.82 This 
role is significant given that traditional leaders are better placed to promote 
environmental conservation measures in their jurisdictions as they are physically closer 
to the people than the government. The Rural District Councils Act assigns to rural local 
governments competency over a number of functional areas, including conservation of 
natural resources, clearing of land, cultivation and farming, fisheries, trees and bush 
fires.83 This suggests that both rural local governments and traditional leaders have 
competency over the preservation of the environment in communal areas. There is an 
absence of clear division of responsibilities with respect to environmental matters 
which often leads to conflict between elected and traditional structures.84 A clearer 
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delineation of competency between rural local authorities and traditional leaders with 
respect to the competency of environmental conservation is therefore required. It 
should be informed by the need to respect the institution of traditional leadership while 
promoting democracy through elected rural local governments.  
5.4 Developmental and co-ordinative role 
Traditional leaders are charged with the facilitation of development in their respective 
jurisdictions through structures, such as the ward and village assemblies.85 They are 
expected to provide an advisory and supportive role to various ministries and agencies 
of the government particularly those operating at the local level.86 For example, 
traditional leaders supervise village heads in the collection of taxes, levies, rates and 
charges due to rural local governments.87 They also act as communication mediums of 
government policies, notices and directives in their respective jurisdictions. Traditional 
leaders are required to promote the maintenance of good standards of health and 
education in their respective jurisdictions.88 Chiefs are expected to liaise and assist 
development committees of rural local governments in all matters relating to the 
planning and implementation of local development programmes.89 The rural population 
seeks the guidance of traditional leaders on a variety of issues affecting their wellbeing, 
more often than that of the democratically elected officials.90 Over the years traditional 
leaders have been active in mobilising people in their respective areas to support 
development projects, such as, the provision of health services, water, sanitation and 
roads.91 
The government has increasingly relied on the institution of traditional 
leadership for the management of natural disasters and containment of epidemic 
diseases in rural areas.92 For example, traditional leaders are often assigned the 
responsibility to distribute food during droughts and the general co-ordination of relief 
programmes. They also distribute farming inputs to rural farmers on behalf of the 
government and other organisations. Non-State actors, such as non-governmental 
organisations, also work in collaboration with traditional leaders when implementing 
most of their projects in rural areas. In most cases, both State and non-State actors seek 
the permission of or at least notify, the traditional leader of the concerned area before 
they implement a development project in that area.93 Thus traditional leaders play an 
important developmental and co-ordinative role in their respective areas by among 
other means, serving as intermediaries between both State and non-State actors and the 
rural populace. 
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5.5 Judicial role 
Traditional leaders play an important role in resolving disputes and conflicts in 
communal and resettlement areas. A study carried out by Matondi between 2004 and 
2007 in Mazowe District94 revealed that the dispute resolution role takes up about 55 
per cent of the official time of the chiefs in the district.95 This dispute resolution role is 
widely acknowledged and dates back prior to the colonisation era.96 The 2013 
Constitution recognises this role by giving traditional leaders the power to resolve 
disputes amongst people in their communities in accordance with customary law.97 The 
Customary Law and Local Courts Act98 enacted under the previous constitutional order 
assigns judicial powers to traditional courts.99 Jurisdiction of these courts is limited to 
civil cases involving parties who reside within the area of the court’s authority, and the 
content of the case has to be suited to trial by customary law.100 Thus traditional courts 
do not have the power to adjudicate on cases of a criminal nature, such as murder or 
rape. However and flowing from tradition, in some cases, traditional leaders do resolve 
disputes involving criminal matters of a less serious nature such as theft and assault. 
Serious cases of a criminal nature are referred to the police for investigation. In districts 
such as Mazowe, the chief presides over two courts, one in communal areas and another 
one in resettled areas, in a bid to reduce the distance travelled by people attending 
court sessions.101 A chief may impose sanctions102 if an accused person is found guilty of 
certain offences or transgressing certain customs and traditions.  
Traditional courts are more accessible to and cheap for rural communities than 
modern courts. When trying cases or resolving disputes, traditional leaders are assisted 
by advisors who are usually from the family of the ruling tribe. They tend to emphasise 
reconciliation rather than retribution to ensure harmony among neighbours, relatives 
and communities in rural areas.103 This is partially the reason why rural communities 
prefer traditional to modern courts. Associated with this dispute resolution role, chiefs 
have wide-ranging law enforcement powers, including the power of search without a 
warrant, arresting powers, and detention of suspects.104 They may also impose 
penalties on offenders with a focus on restitution so as to restore the status quo rather 
than as punishment.105 Traditional leaders may order confiscation of assets, such as, 
livestock if a suspect fails to appear before the court or abide by their orders. The 
dispute resolution role of traditional leaders is widely accepted by the government and 
rural population. This role, however, is slowly being questioned in the light of a number 
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of factors, including unethical and criminal conduct by some traditional leaders. In S v 
Manenji & Another106 a village head was found guilty of murder with actual intent.107 
This case indicates that some traditional leaders are involved in some grave acts of 
criminal conduct. The low educational levels of most traditional leaders and their 
inability to apply a consistent doctrine of precedent have also raised doubts about their 
competence and credibility as judicial officials.108 A study carried out by Rukuni and 
others also revealed that some traditional leaders are failing to exercise impartiality 
when adjudicating cases, particularly with respect to politically sensitive matters and in 
cases where they have an interest, such as, boundary disputes or where relatives are 
involved.109 However, it still remains a fact that traditional leaders play an important 
role as a dispute resolution mechanism in rural areas, thereby complementing the 
modern judicial system given its limited reach. 
6 RELATIONS BETWEEN TRADITIONAL LEADERS AND GOVERNMENT 
STRUCTURES 
The existence of two parallel governance structures in rural areas requires mechanisms 
to promote co-operation and co-ordination between them. In the colonial era, provision 
was made for the establishment of a body, the Council of Chiefs, representing chiefs and 
charged with engaging the government on matters affecting traditional communities. 
Similar structures have been created and strengthened in the post-colonial era. 
Traditional leaders have representation in a number of government forums at national, 
provincial and local levels of government. An examination of the representation of 
chiefs in Parliament, provincial councils and rural local governments will be undertaken 
in this part. The role of the National Council of Chiefs and provincial assemblies of chiefs 
will also be discussed. 
6.1 Representation in Parliament and provincial councils 
Zimbabwe has a bi-cameral Parliament constituted by the Senate and the National 
Assembly. Traditional leaders are represented in the Senate by a total of 16 chiefs.110 
Each provincial assembly of chiefs in the eight non-metropolitan provinces appoints 
two chiefs to the Senate.111 The President and Deputy President of the National Council 
of Chiefs are automatically members of the Senate.112 The two chiefs appointed by each 
provincial assembly of chiefs, as members of the Senate, are also members of the 
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provincial council in their respective provinces.113 At the time of writing (August 2016), 
provincial councils have not been established yet for a number of reasons, including the 
absence of the operationalizing legislation. The same applies to the President and 
Deputy President of the National Council of Chiefs in their respective provinces.114 The 
membership of chiefs in Parliament and provincial councils is designed to ensure the 
representation of the interests of traditional leaders and those of their communities in 
major decision making bodies. It is claimed that chiefs in Parliament have always voted 
in support of ZANU-PF regardless of the merits or demerits of the issue.115 For instance, 
all chiefs in the Senate voted in support of the “controversial” Local Government Bill of 
2016116 along with ZANU-PF senators. This supports the argument that chiefs seem to 
be aligned to the ruling ZANU-PF, which is expanded upon below. In addition to the 
representation of traditional leaders in Parliament and provincial councils, the 
President and the national Minister responsible for traditional affairs usually attend the 
annual conference of chiefs which discusses and seeks to bring to the government‘s 
attention the concerns and interests of traditional leaders.  
6.2 Representation in councils of rural local authorities 
The Rural District Councils Act which primarily govern the activities of rural local 
government does not provide for the role of chiefs in the proceedings of a council of 
rural local authorities. However, there is a culture in rural local government which 
developed prior to independence where chiefs are treated as ex officio members of 
councils with no voting powers.117 Chiefs are given a platform to address a council, 
especially on issues which concern their powers and responsibilities or the customs and 
traditions of people living in their respective jurisdictions. This is commendable given 
that chiefs and rural local governments administer the same jurisdiction. The absence of 
voting powers, however, significantly reduces the status and influence of chiefs in rural 
municipal councils.118 The current practice is that the Minister of Local Government 
nominates a total of three chiefs, on a rotational basis, for representation on a council.  
There may be rationality in legally recognising the culture of chiefs serving as ex 
officio members of councils. Such recognition has the advantage of providing greater 
clarity as to the nomination of chiefs to and their role in, the council.119 However, not 
more than three chiefs should be appointed as representatives on the council so that 
non-elected elements do not dominate democratically elected councils.120 Such 
legislation should also require each council of a local authority to give the relevant chief 
the opportunity to express a view on the matter before taking a decision on any matter 
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directly affecting the area of the relevant traditional authority.121 This will allow 
traditional leaders, including those who would not have been nominated to sit on the 
council the opportunity to express their views on any matter before the council which 
affect their respective jurisdictions. In light of fairness, traditional leaders who 
participate in the proceedings of the municipal council should be given an allowance to 
cover out-of-pocket expenses. Further, the participation of any traditional leader in the 
proceedings of the council should be governed by the rules and procedures of the 
council, including an applicable code of conduct.  
While the legislative and institutional framework seems to provide an enabling 
platform for the integration of modern state structures and traditional institutions, the 
relations between the two structures is cause for concern in practice. The relations 
between traditional leaders and councillors have not always been cordial since 
significant governance powers and remuneration packages were restored to traditional 
leaders in 2002.122 This has been attributed to a number of reasons. First, the existence 
of the institution of traditional leadership parallel with elected rural local governments 
has created “conflicting claims to legitimacy and uneasy co-existence”.123 There is 
mistrust between chiefs and councillors which makes it difficult to build constructive 
relations. Ndoro argues that “to traditional leaders, councillors are a challenge to their 
hegemony, prestige and authority”.124 She further asserts that, given the option, 
traditional leaders would prefer to be the sole local government structure in communal 
areas.125 This is evidenced by the fact that chiefs and councillors often trade accusations 
of abuse of power and non-compliance with laws, customs and traditions.126 The Centre 
for Conflict Management and Transformation (CCMT) cited one case in which the chief 
boycotted ward development committee (WADCO) meetings and further directed 
village heads to report village development committee proceedings directly to him and 
not to the ward councillor who chairs the WADCO, as highlighted above.127 Such 
conflicts created by the establishment of parallel structures undermine development 
activities by creating divisions among the rural populace. 
There is also perceived unfair remuneration between chiefs and councillors.  
Chiefs are paid better allowances and receive a number of benefits in comparison to 
councillors. As highlighted above, chiefs are also allowed to keep court appearance fees 
and fines imposed on offenders in their traditional courts. Furthermore, chiefs benefit 
from subsidised vehicle purchasing, electrification and house construction schemes. 
These benefits have somehow commercialised the institution of traditional leadership 
by making the positions of chief, headman and village head vehicles for access to income 
and resources.128 This desire for personal gain tends to create conflict between 
traditional leaders and their respective communities. It is thus not surprising that 
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disputes surrounding the appointment of traditional leaders are on the rise. On the 
other hand, councillors do not have all these benefits but only have ‘small’ sitting and 
travelling allowances. The huge differences in remuneration packages between these 
officials is a source of growing tension as councillors feel side lined, lowered in status 
and discriminated against relative to chiefs. At the same time, chiefs tend to command 
more respect from rural communities than do councillors and even Members of 
Parliament, in some cases.129 As a result, councillors are overshadowed by chiefs in 
rural local government, and in the process raising tensions. The tension which exists 
between chiefs and councillors has the potential to destabilise rural local government 
by undermining the respective roles of these two institutions. Hence, there is a need to 
redefine the relationships between chiefs and councillors. Such redefinition should 
focus on division of responsibilities between chiefs and rural local authorities 
(councillors) and the improvement of remuneration packages of councillors, among 
other issues.130 
6.3 The National Council of Chiefs and Provincial Assemblies of Chiefs 
The National Council of Chiefs and provincial assemblies of chiefs are not government 
structures per se but constitutional bodies established to promote and protect the 
interests of traditional leaders. Section 285(1) of the Constitution provides that “there is 
a National Council of Chiefs constituted in accordance with an Act of Parliament, to 
represent all Chiefs in Zimbabwe”. The Traditional Leaders Act provides that the 
National Council of Chiefs consists of chiefs nominated by the provincial assemblies of 
chiefs. The Act gives the Minister responsible for traditional affairs full discretion to 
determine the total number of chiefs which each provincial assembly is entitled to elect 
for representation on the Council. It is submitted that the Minister no longer has such 
discretion as the 2013 Constitution requires equitable representation of chiefs from 
each province on the Council. The Constitution further provides that “an Act of 
Parliament must establish for each province, other than the metropolitan provinces, a 
provincial assembly of Chiefs consisting of the chiefs in that province”.131 The 
Constitution lists the functions of the National Council and provincial assemblies of 
chiefs as follows: 
a) to protect, promote and develop Zimbabwe’s culture and traditions; 
b) to represent the views of traditional leaders and to maintain the 
integrity and status of traditional institutions; 
c) to protect and promote and advance the interests of traditional 
leaders; 
d) to consider  representations and complaints made to it by 
traditional leaders; 
e) to define and enforce correct and ethical conduct on the part of 
traditional leaders and to develop their capacity for leadership; 
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f) to facilitate the settlement of disputes between and concerning 
traditional leaders; and 
g) to perform any other functions that may be conferred or imposed 
on it by an Act of Parliament.132 
The implementation of the 2013 Constitution requires the amendment of sections 36 
and 39 of the Traditional Leaders Act so as to provide for the additional functions which 
the National Council of Chiefs and provincial assemblies of chiefs have under the new 
constitutional order. Parliament is directed to enact legislation to ensure that they are 
able to “carry out their functions independently and efficiently” as well as ensuring that 
employees of these bodies carry out their duties “conscientiously and impartially”.133 It 
is important to note that the National Council of Chiefs and provincial assemblies of 
chiefs do not make any laws, nor do they engage in the provision of public services. 
These are platforms where traditional leaders engage among themselves as well as with 
the government on issues affecting the institution of traditional leadership and rural 
governance, in general. These issues include mining in rural areas, proposed 
infrastructural projects, relocation of people to make way for businesses activities, 
distribution of farming inputs to peasant farmers, and the operation of ministries and 
agencies in rural areas. Thus far, there is little evidence to suggest that deliberation in 
these institutions have had a significant impact on public policy at any level of 
government. 
7 CONDUCT OF TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
Traditional leaders are required to act in accordance with the Constitution and the laws 
of Zimbabwe.134 They must observe the customs pertaining to traditional leadership 
and exercise their functions for the purposes for which the institution of traditional 
leadership has been recognised.135 When carrying out their duties, the Constitution 
requires chiefs to treat all persons equally and fairly.136 It further provides that chiefs 
may not be members of any political party or in any way participate in partisan politics, 
including furthering the interests of any political party.137 The Traditional Leaders Act 
states that when carrying out their duties traditional leaders should not be “influenced 
by any considerations of race, tribe, place of origin, creed, gender or political 
affiliation”.138 For example, when adjudicating disputes a chief should not give 
favourable decisions based on whether the person before the court is a woman or man 
or belongs to the ruling or opposition political party. This implies that whenever chiefs 
discharge their responsibilities they must be neutral.  
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The political neutrality of chiefs may be weakened by the conflicting legal 
demands imposed on traditional leaders by the Constitution and Traditional Leaders 
Act. As observed above, a total of 18 chiefs form part of the composition of the Senate, a 
political forum.139 These chiefs who are appointed as Senators deliberate fully on all 
matters before the Senate, in the same way as elected Senators. This essentially means 
that these traditional leaders become politicians the moment they are appointed as 
Senator-Chiefs. When these Chiefs vote alongside a certain political party, they will be 
effectively breaching the requirement of political neutrality. Thus, there are conflicting 
legal demands imposed on chiefs. This perhaps indicates the tension between 
traditional governance systems and the requirements of modern day societies anchored 
on democratic values, such as, multiparty democracy. To address this tension there may 
be rationality in keeping the representation of traditional leaders in the Senate but 
withdraw their voting rights. 
Section 287 of the Constitution directs Parliament to enact a law providing for 
the establishment and role of an Integrity and Ethics Committee of Chiefs to ensure that 
traditional leaders abide by the required code of conduct and take corrective action, if 
necessary. The relevant Committee had not been established at the time of writing, 
meaning that any unscrupulous behaviour on the part of traditional leaders may be 
going unpunished, as proven in practice. While traditional leaders are required to be 
apolitical, they are perceived by many to be aligned with ruling the ZANU-PF and 
furthering its ideologies and interests.140 A study undertaken by Rukuni and others in 
the Bikita District established that 94 per cent of traditional leaders in the district are 
politically aligned to the ruling ZANU-PF and have used their positions to “punish those 
who belong to opposition political parties”.141 Like the successive colonial governments, 
ZANU-PF appears to use both “carrot” and “stick” methods to acquire the allegiance of 
chiefs. Makumbe claims that prior to general elections State agencies often direct chiefs 
to support ZANU-PF and prevent the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) political 
party from mobilising political support in their jurisdictions.142 He further argues that 
chiefs who fail to follow these directives are allegedly threatened with harassment 
leaving them without a choice but to comply.143  
The ZANU-PF led government also uses the “carrot” method, with which benefits 
are offered to acquire the allegiance of chiefs.144 Some of the benefits which are offered 
include a monthly allowance, a subsidised vehicle purchasing scheme, a monthly fuel 
allocation, drilling of boreholes and electrification of the homes of chiefs. As a result, 
most traditional leaders openly support the political agenda of the ruling party and 
restrict political mobilisation by opposition political parties. As stated above, the 2013 
Constitution prohibits chiefs from aligning themselves with a certain political party 
whilst they are occupying the position of a chief, a requirement with which most chiefs 
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are not complying. Surprisingly, the open alignment of chiefs with ZANU-PF does not 
appear to damage the legitimacy of traditional leadership among rural citizens although 
there seem to be growing mistrust of, and disrespect towards, traditional leaders.145 
Hence, like the successive colonial governments, the independence government of 
ZANU-PF has at various stages tampered with the institution of traditional leadership in 
driving its interests and ultimately to ensure its political survival. 
8 CONCLUSION 
The 2013 Constitution has recognised the important role which the institution of 
traditional leadership plays in Zimbabwe, especially in rural governance. Traditional 
leaders are generally regarded and accepted as the custodians of customs and traditions 
entrusted to them to provide traditional guidance to their respective communities. They 
have a diversity of functions ranging from mere administrative functions to much more 
extensive judicial and development duties. Thus the role of the institution of traditional 
leadership is largely still relevant to modern day society. However, the existence of the 
institution parallel to modern state structures has in some cases resulted in conflicts 
and duplication of duties. The mechanisms established to ensure a certain measure of 
integration and co-operation between the two institutions sometimes do not always 
bring the desired result. It is the political alignment of traditional leaders with the ruling 
party, however, which raises significant conflicts of interest. Most traditional leaders 
openly align themselves with the ruling ZANU-PF in contradiction of the Constitution 
which requires their non-involvement in politically related activities. Despite such 
controversy, traditional leaders remain the most accessible and immediate form of local 
governance in rural areas. They may be better positioned to identify the needs and 
preferences of rural communities because of their physical proximity to the people. 
Over the years they have demonstrated remarkable resilience, a strength which the 
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